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1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses some of the methodological issues involved in analysing military 
expenditure data, with particular reference to the extended SIPRI dataset. SIPRI military 
expenditure data, which previously started in 1988 now extends back to 1945. The other main 
source of data on military expenditures, the US Department of State WMEAT(2015) only 
gives eleven years of data, 2002-2012.  
 
As is pointed out in SIPRI (2015, p400) there are three main types of issue with the data: 
validity, what is the appropriate concept to measure? reliability, how well is it being 
measured? and comparability, is the same thing being measured over time and space? This 
paper considers each of these in turn and then looks at the econometric issues in the use of 
such data. Little in this paper is new. The difficulties with measuring military expenditure are 
well known, Brzoska (1996) begins his survey by saying “Military Expenditure is difficult to 
define”.  But since the points are not always appreciated, they may bear repetition.  Many of 
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these points are discussed in the SIPRI Sources and Methods section of the military 
expenditure chapter, SIPRI (2015, p400-4002) also available on the SIPRI webpages. 
Omitoogun and Skons (2006) discuss the origins of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Project. 
They note that the rationale for establishing SIPRI, and by implication the Military 
Expenditure Project was to produce a “factual and balanced account of a controversial subject 
- the arms race and attempts to stop it”. It is somewhat ironic that many of the most devoted 
users of SIPRI data are in defence establishments.  
 
 
2. Validity 
 
The validity of the measure, how closely it relates to the relevant concept, depends on the 
purpose for which the concept is being used and military expenditure measures are used for 
many purposes. As Dunne (1999, p377) points out “Military statistics, like other statistics, are 
not objective facts; they are constructed using theory and reflect social relations. They are 
also estimated using available information (there are no true statistics hidden in the military 
establishment waiting to be discovered).”   
 
Similarly WMEAT (2015p1) begins “Readers should note that WMEAT figures, especially 
for armed forces personnel, military expenditures and arms transfers, are neither so accurate 
nor so reliable as uniform presentation in statistical tables might seem to imply, due to 
incompleteness, ambiguity, or total absence of data for some countries either in those 
parameters or in parameters, such as GDP price deflators or rates used to convert national-
currency-denominated values to US dollars.”    
 
In the country itself, it is the government that constructs the military expenditure data, 
primarily for purposes of budgetary control, fiscal policy and national defence planning. The 
measures may be used to assess the opportunity costs of military expenditure, the other uses 
to which the resources could be put, and thus contribute to arguments for reduced military 
spending or disarmament. Abroad, other countries may use the figures to assess threats from 
enemies or burden sharing by allies. Finally, the data are widely used for qualitative and 
quantitative academic research. These different users have different demands of the data and 
thus different concepts of validity.     
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SIPRI publishes three main measures of military expenditure: in local currency at current 
prices; in constant US dollars; and as a share of gross domestic product, GDP. For national 
budgeting purposes, the local currency, current price measure is the most relevant. For 
comparisons of the levels of military expenditure across time, one needs to remove the effects 
of inflation, for comparisons of the levels of military expenditure across countries one needs 
to express the figures in a common currency. The constant US dollar figure does both. We 
discuss the issues involved in comparisons further below.  
 
The share of military expenditure in GDP indicates the priority attached to the military, how 
much of available output is devoted to defence, and is sometimes referred to as the military 
burden. The share, being a pure number, is comparable over time and space, without the 
complications of having to choose a price index or exchange rate, but it reveals nothing about 
the level of military expenditure. The share may be taken as an indication of commitment or 
intent as suggested by the importance attached by NATO to the agreement at the 2014 
Cardiff summit to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence.
2
 GDP is itself  a problematic 
concept and revisions to the GDP figures can have a substantial impact on the estimated 
share. 
 
SIPRI also provide, in a worksheet, military expenditure per capita in current US dollars and 
military expenditure as a share of general government expenditure. The share of government 
expenditure may be relevant for budgeting purposes; but given differences in the size and 
definition of government expenditure, over time and between countries, the share of 
government expenditure is less comparable than the share of GDP. There are many other 
potentially interesting ratios such as military expenditure per member of the armed forces, 
which gives some indication of the capital intensity of the provision.  
 
There is an issue as to what price index should be used to deflate the current price military 
expenditure series. SIPRI uses a Consumer Price Index, CPI, which is consistent with an 
opportunity cost interpretation of the measure: the real amount of consumer goods given up 
to finance the military. To get a measure of the real output of defence would require a 
defence specific deflator. SIPRI comment that military specific deflators are not available for 
most countries. Using military specific deflators for some countries and CPIs for others 
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would reduce international comparability. Even where they are available, military specific 
deflators are controversial, since the price and quantity of defence are not well defined.  A 
series of articles on the measurement of defence inflation appear in a special issue of Defence 
and Peace Economics 27(2) April 2016. 
 
As SIPRI emphasise, military expenditure is an input measure, the flow of resources devoted 
to the military over a period; not an output measure of the stock of armed forces or their 
military effectiveness. The forces obtained for the expenditure will depend on their price, the 
wages of troops and the cost of weapons. The wages will depend on such factors as the level 
of income of the country and whether there is conscription. The cost of weapons will depend 
on the efficiency of the procurement process and of the arms industry. The military 
effectiveness of those forces will depend on training, logistics, maintenance of the existing 
equipment, morale and leadership, strategy and tactics.  
The correlation between military expenditure and military forces may be very low.  The 
issues are illustrated by the 1976 revision of estimated Soviet military spending by the US 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA. The incident is described by one of the analysts involved 
in Noren (2003).  The CIA calculated Soviet military spending by a building block method. It 
first estimated the forces: numbers of troops, tanks, ships and missiles. Reasonable estimates 
of these could be obtained from technical intelligence sources such as satellite photographs.  
It then estimated what it would have cost the USA to purchase these forces, giving a dollar 
figure.  This was then multiplied by an estimated rouble-dollar exchange rate, to get a rouble 
figure, which could then be expressed as a share of CIA estimates of Soviet GNP. In 1975, 
the CIA got "an unusually large body of new information" that suggested the Soviet military 
industry was much less efficient than it had previously thought and altered the exchange rate 
to reflect this. This raised the estimated share of military expenditure in GNP from less than 
8% to 11-13%. Noren (2003) emphasises that the revision did not affect CIA's appraisal of 
the size or capabilities of Soviet military forces or change appreciably the estimated dollar 
cost of reproducing Soviet defence programs. The revision reflected the fact that the CIA 
thought that it was costing the Soviets far more resources to produce those forces. Although 
the revision reflected a judgement that the Soviets were less efficient than had been 
previously thought, it was interpreted as showing that the Soviets were more threatening than 
had been previously thought.  Subsequently some have argued that the Soviet economy was 
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even less efficient than the CIA thought, and the actual share of military expenditure could 
have been over 20%.    
The dangers of using measures of military expenditure as a measure of strength is also 
indicated by the fact that, contrary to Voltaire’s judgement that God was on the side of the 
big battalions,  the weak often win wars, Arreguin-Toft (2005). They can do this through 
asymmetric warfare, fighting in ways that the strong do not expect. A recent example of the 
difference between expenditure and effectiveness is the cost of preparing the 9-11 attack by 
the four planes.  The 9-11 Commission (2004) estimate that the cost was between $400,000 
and $500,000, a tiny expenditure compared either to its effect or to typical military spending 
numbers.   
 
3. Reliability 
 
Since different users will require different concepts, the issue of reliability, how well the 
concept is measured? cannot be completely separated from the issue of validity, what is the 
relevant concept?  In most countries the definition of military expenditure is determined by 
institutional factors: what is included in the budget of the Ministry of Defence; rather than 
functional factors: what contributes to military capability. Thus it can be rather arbitrary 
whether functions like civilian search and rescue or disaster relief are included in the defence 
budget, depending on whether they happen to be done by the military or not.    SIPRI has a 
standard definition which they try to apply but note that “While this definition serves as a 
guideline, in practice it is often difficult to adhere to due to data limitations.” 
 
Even among countries that provide a lot of data, reliability is reduced by a lack of uniformity 
in definitions of military expenditure. There are also problems of valuation, such as 
conscripts paid below market wages, or direct expropriation of resources without payment.  
Definitional differences include the line drawn between military and internal security 
functions including paramilitaries like the French Gendarmerie and the extent to which 
intelligence functions are included in the defence budget. In order to meet its commitment to 
NATO to spend 2% of GDP on defence, in 2015 the UK redefined the spending it declared to 
NATO, including elements of intelligence and security services that had not previously been 
included.  
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New approaches to financing, such as public private partnerships, where the private partner 
makes the investment and the public partner pays for the services over the years, complicate 
the calculations. The accounting may be on a cash basis, when the money is spent, or an 
accruals basis, when the liability is incurred. Some governments are following private sector 
accounting, and reporting a balance sheet of assets with associated charges for capital 
employed and depreciation. Pensions are a cost of doing business and should be included in 
the defence budget but institutional systems differ. Some include payments into a pension 
fund for serving troops, some include payment of pensions to past veterans. 
 
Some countries, particularly poorer ones, refuse to publish any numbers or provide little 
detail, beyond a single undefined number. This may be the amount budgeted, rather than the 
amount spent, and may exclude categories like arms imports or capital expenditure. There is 
also deliberate manipulation of the data, including financing items off-budget. Some uses of 
the data can be counter-productive. As Omitoogun and Skons (2006) note, some foreign aid 
donors made lower military expenditure a condition for giving aid. This provides a direct 
incentive for countries to under-estimate military expenditure.  
 
Ferguson and Perlo-Freeman (2015) find that countries that are less free (based on the 
Freedom House measure) provide fewer years of data, as do more fragile states (based on the 
World Bank State Fragility Index). It does not seem to be available resources that determine 
the availability of data, since after controlling for freedom and fragility, income is 
insignificant. The low transparency seems a matter of choice for low freedom states and a 
matter of capability for fragile states: they are unable to produce high quality numbers.  Many 
other factors must matter since freedom and fragility only explain 29% of the variation in the 
availability of data.  
 
The quality of military expenditure numbers deteriorates during conflict and the definitional 
difficulties can increase, since most conflicts now are intra-state rather than inter-state. This 
makes it harder to distinguish military functions from police or internal security functions. 
 
 
4. Comparability 
 
There are trade-offs between comparability over time, inter-temporal consistency, and 
comparability over space, international consistency between countries.  As noted above, to 
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compare levels of military expenditure across time, one needs to remove the effects of 
inflation to get a real, constant price, series. To compare military expenditures across 
countries one needs to express the figures in a common currency, typically dollars. There are 
a number of ways one could get a constant dollar figure. WMEAT(2015) gives estimates 
based on five different methods of converting to US dollars and notes that the results yielded 
by these methods may differ substantially, both over time and across countries. It discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of each. For instance, one could either (a) deflate the local 
currency series by a national price index and convert at the exchange rate of a base year or (b) 
convert the local currency current price series to dollars using the exchange rates of each year 
and then deflate by a US price index. SIPRI uses procedure (a) since it maintains the structure 
of the time series of real expenditure for the country, undistorted by exchange rate variations. 
But the cross-section pattern can be very sensitive to the base year chosen for the exchange 
rate and relative military expenditures between countries can change a lot when the base year 
is changed. Comparisons of the relative military expenditure of two countries far from the 
base year can also be misleading. SIPRI uses market exchange rates, rather than purchasing 
power parity rates, for reasons explained in SIPRI (2015, 401-2). WMEAT (2015, p29-34) 
discusses some of the considerations and describe their method 5, which attempts to construct 
a defence specific PPP measure. This uses the ratio of military spending per member of the 
armed forces  to GDP per member of the labour force (as measures of capital intensity) to 
assign the defence sector dollar PPP value of military spending to a point on the interval 
between the market exchange rate and PPP values. 
  
Revisions are inevitable as new data on both military expenditures and economic variables 
like GDP become available, so there can be big differences in series in different Yearbooks. 
Revisions can also be caused by rebasing of price indices or exchange rates. Brauer (2002), 
reviewing the literature on Greek Turkish arms races, noted that there were some 
“astonishing differences” in the time series graphs in two papers, despite being for the same 
time period and from the same source, SIPRI, though they used different yearbooks and 
different exchange rate bases.  Definitional changes raise difficult issues. Although the 
NATO definition of military expenditure is similar to that used by SIPRI; in 2004 NATO 
changed its definition to exclude paramilitary forces. Had, SIPRI followed NATO, it would 
cause a large change in the estimates for countries that have paramilitaries, like France. 
WMEAT (2015, p8) followed NATO in changing the definition and notes  “The data 
discontinuities resulting from the applications of the new definitions are large for some 
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countries.”  SIPRI chose to maintain comparability over time, at the cost of comparability 
across countries.  SIPRI (2015, p400) say “priority is given to choosing a uniform time series 
for each country, in order to achieve consistency over time, rather than to adjusting the 
figures for individual years according to a common definition.”  The detailed data required to 
adjust for classification differences over time are rarely available.  
 
When faced with two overlapping estimates on a different basis, it is common to project the 
later series backwards by “splicing” them using the ratio during the overlap period. This 
preserves the growth rates of the two series, but it imposes the level difference at the time of 
overlap on the whole of the earlier spliced series. In addition, such splicing may not preserve 
accounting identities, e.g. making components of military expenditure sum to the total, 
though, since SIPRI does not currently report components, this is not yet an issue.  
 
 
5. Econometric issues 
 
There is now data for t=1,2,…,T for countries i=1,2,…,N where the maximum values of both 
T=65 and N=172 are large. This allows considerable flexibility in how one models the data. 
 
The first econometric issue in studies using military expenditure data is whether one is using 
the data in time-series, cross-section or in panel. The main benefit of the extended series is 
for time series analysis, since the large T allows for a more flexible treatment of the 
dynamics. This is important, since both the level and share seem to be integrated of order 
one, they need to be differenced once to make them stationary, and allowing for lags is 
important to reproduce the time-series properties of the data, including any cointegration 
among the levels of the variables. The large T of the extended SIPRI data set allows one to 
model not just the dynamics, but also to allow for heterogeneity and cross-section 
dependence in panels and to test for structural breaks, e.g. at the end of the Cold War.     
 
In cross-section, a central issue tends to be functional form, for instance the effect of military 
expenditure on growth may be different at different levels of military expenditure or different 
levels of threat. While one needs data in comparable units, such as constant US dollars, for 
cross-section analysis, the treatment of prices and exchange rates in the conversion may add 
more noise into the relationships. In spatial models, which can be estimated from both cross-
section and panel data, one is interested in measuring the effect of neighbours behaviour. 
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Therefore it is important to have a full list of neighbours available, and this may restrict the 
time period for which data for all the neighbours are available.      
 
In panels if one is using balanced data, with the same time period for each country, there is a 
clear trade-off:  the larger T the smaller N; fewer countries have data for long time periods.  
The set of missing countries is not random. If one wants a long run of data back to 1945, this 
excludes both many poor colonies, that only became independent later, and all the former 
Soviet republics, which did not exist before the end of 1991. Countries with much missing 
data are also not a randomly selected group of countries; as noted above, fragile and less free 
states are less likely to provide data. Thus with an unbalanced panel, changes over time may 
reflect the mix of countries in the sample rather than any real changes in the relationship.      
 
A second econometric issue is whether military expenditure is the dependent or an 
independent variable in an equation. For instance in the arms race or demand for military 
expenditure literature, military expenditure is the dependent variable and GDP is typically 
treated as an exogenous independent variable. In the military expenditure and growth 
literature, military expenditures is typically treated as an independent variable and GDP is 
treated as the dependent variable. This simultaneity, both GDP and military expenditure 
being treated as endogenous in different literatures, raises delicate issues of identification. In 
particular, to identify both relationships in a system that determines both GDP and military 
expenditure one needs some exogenous measure of the threat that moves military expenditure 
but not GDP and some exogenous supply variable that moves GDP but not military 
expenditure.  The relevant theory might also suggest using different measures of military 
expenditure depending on whether it is a dependent or independent variable.   
   
A third issue is whether the level or share is the appropriate measure. Brauer (2002) has a 
nice discussion of this choice. While the choice depends on the purpose of the exercise and 
the question being asked, one can often include both the logarithm of the level of military 
expenditure and the logarithm of GDP, in common units, and test for the restriction that it is 
the share, the difference between log military expenditure and GDP, that matters. An income 
elasticity of demand for military expenditure close to one often seems reasonable. In models 
explaining growth, one tends to include the share of investment in GDP as a determinant, so 
by analogy the share of military expenditure may be an appropriate determinant.      
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A fourth issue is the treatment of uncertainty. SIPRI signal degrees of uncertainty with round 
or square brackets and this information could be used to examine the effects of measurement 
error and the sensitivity of the conclusions to the use of different quality measures of military 
expenditure. But as noted above, the quality of military expenditure data is correlated with 
other things such as state capacity, and this introduces further complications.  A number of 
studies have compared SIPRI measures with other measures, such as WMEAT, and used 
differences between them as another indicator of uncertainty. But if they both use the same 
single source, they may agree on a poor quality number.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The extended SIPRI data set allows a range of new questions, particularly in the time series 
dimension, to be answered with a high quality data set. But the limitations of measurement 
and the concerns of validity, reliability and comparability must be appreciated. Feeding the 
data into the computer is not enough, sensitivity to the question being asked, to the  
qualitative historical features of the countries concerned, and the econometric issues, 
particularly identification, is also required. 
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